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A BETTER MADDEN FIX: HOLISTIC REFORM, NOT BAND-AIDS,
TO MODERNIZE BANKING LAW
Matthew J. Razzano*

INTRODUCTION
Historically, state usury laws prohibited lending above certain
interest rates, but in 1978 the Supreme Court interpreted the
National Bank Act (NBA) to allow chartered banks to issue loans at
rates based on where they were headquartered rather than where the
loan originated.1 States like South Dakota virtually eliminated
interest rate ceilings to attract business, incentivizing national banks
to base credit operations there and avoid local usury laws.2 In 2015,
however, the Second Circuit decided Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC
and reversed long-standing banking practices, ruling that nonchartered financial institutions were not covered by the NBA and
were therefore subject to state usury laws where the loan originated.3
The underlying reasoning for the court’s decision was wellintentioned and based on (a) an unwillingness to allow non-chartered
institutions to function as pseudo-banks4 and (b) a desire to protect
consumers.5 The court’s radical decision received widespread
criticism,6 and empirical studies have demonstrated a noteworthy
decrease in credit availability in the Second Circuit 7—negating the
court’s own policy rationales. Since Madden, Congress and federal
agencies have attempted an outright reversal, but none of their
solutions address the Madden court’s fundamental concerns. This
*
Law Clerk, J.D., University of Notre Dame, 2019; M.Sc., London School of Economics,
2016; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2012.
1.
Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978)
(holding that the National Bank Act preempted state usury laws, which allowed interest rates
to be based on the state where the bank was headquartered and not where the loans were
issued); see also Sean H. Vanatta, Citibank, Credit Cards, and the Local Politics of National
Consumer
Finance,
1968–1991,
90
BUS. HIST.
REV.
57,
64–68
(2015),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-history-review/article/citibank-creditcards-and-the-local-politics-of-national-consumer-finance-19681991/680B71265464A22A9-B83108EEE33-6547.
2.
See Vanatta, supra note 1, at 72–77.
3.
Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
4.
Id. at 251–52.
5.
Id. at 250–51.
6.
See, e.g., Raj Date, Madden Ruling was a Step Backward. Congress Should Fix It, Am.
Banker (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/madden-ruling-was-astep-backward-congress-should-fix-it; Peter Rudegeair & Telis Demos, LendingClub to Change
its Fee Model, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-growing-lendingclub-to-change-its-fee-model-1456488393.
7.
See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Can Fintech Increase Lending? How Courts are Undermining
Financial Inclusion, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research
/can-fintech-increase-lending-how-courts-are-undermining-financial-inclusion/
(summarizing the primary critiques of the Madden decision and discussing two empirical
studies about the case’s impact on credit availability in the Second Circuit).
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Essay argues that a Madden fix is needed, but the most effective
solution must incorporate and address the Second Circuit’s
underlying concerns.
I.

ATTEMPTED MADDEN FIXES AND THEIR FAILURES

Before Madden, large banks strategically shifted lending risk by
securitizing and selling high-risk loans to third-party financial
institutions. The Madden decision hindered this tactic by subjecting
these non-chartered financial institutions to usury laws of the state
where the loan originated, as opposed to the lender’s headquarter
state.8 The non-headquarter state usury laws tend to have lower
interest rate caps, making securitization and lending by nonchartered financial institutions less profitable. Without this strategic
business option, these institutions had less incentive to lend. In
Madden’s immediate aftermath, empirical studies demonstrated
decreased lending rates in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.
Legal scholar Colleen Honigsberg and others took data from three
large lending platforms and found that post-Madden, creditors
started offering “less credit to borrowers . . . . Not only did lenders
make smaller loans in these states post-Madden, but they also
declined to issue loans to the higher-risk borrowers most likely to
borrow above usury rates.”9 Meanwhile, lending “increased after
Madden outside the Second Circuit,” further illustrating the impact of
the decision.10 These findings conform with basic economic
assumptions. A study conducted by economists showed similar
results: “Consistent with classical price theory, the interest rate
controls imposed by Madden result in credit rationing. Lending Club
and Prosper, the two largest U.S. marketplace lenders, significantly
reduce[d] lending in [Connecticut and New York] . . . . by 10% and
13.4% respectively.”11
After Madden, various interest groups sought to reverse the
Second Circuit’s decision. Several government actors and institutions
attempted to overturn it, or at least temper its effects. Representative
Patrick McHenry (R-NC) introduced the Protecting Consumers’
Access to Credit Act of 2016, which would amend the National Bank
8.
See, e.g., DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4461, MARKETPLACE LENDING: FINTECH
CONSUMER AND SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44614.pdf
(describing the marketplace lending business and how Madden has impacted it).
9.
Colleen Honigsberg et al., How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending?
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 60 J.L. & ECON. 673, 674–75 (2017).
10.
Id. at 694.
11.
Piotr Danisewicz & Ilaf Elard, The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace
Lending and Personal Bankruptcy 4 (July 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3208908.
IN
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Act to make loans originating from chartered financial institutions
valid when made, regardless of whether the loan was subsequently
transferred or sold.12 Having made little headway, Representative
McHenry reintroduced the bill in 2017 with bipartisan signatories,13
and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA) simultaneously introduced it in the
Senate.14 These legislative efforts, however, were nothing more than
single-page reversals of Madden without considering the Madden
court’s underlying policy concerns. Neither of these bills made
significant progress in Congress.15
Given Congress’s difficulties addressing the problem through
legislative action, banking regulators attempted to leverage their
rulemaking powers to blunt Madden’s impact. First, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the principal banking regulator
under the NBA16 and agency responsible for issuing bank charters,17
explored granting special purpose charters for FinTech firms.18
FinTech firms are not normally covered by the NBA.19 These special
purpose charters offered protection from state usury laws that cap
interest rates.20
The FinTech charters quickly faced legal roadblocks, and the
Southern District of New York questioned the OCC’s authority to
grant the charters to FinTech firms in the first place.21 The NBA allows
the OCC to grant charters to institutions in the “business of
banking.”22 The OCC defines special purpose charter “businesses” as
including “at least one of the following three core banking functions:
Receiving deposits; paying checks; or lending money.”23 The Southern

12.
Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2016, H.R. 5724, 114th Cong. (2016) (“A
loan that is valid when made as to its maximum rate of interest in accordance with this section
shall remain valid with respect to such rate regardless of whether the loan is subsequently sold,
assigned, or otherwise transferred to a third party.’’).
13.
See Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017, H.R. 3299, 115th Cong. (2017).
14.
See Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017, S. 1642, 115th Cong. (2017).
15.
While the Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act made its way through the House
and was introduced in the Senate, the Senate has taken no action. Given the subsequent OCC
and FDIC rules, it is unlikely that Congress will reintroduce these bills.
16.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
17.
See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (2017).
18.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK
CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 4 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsibleinnovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf
[hereinafter
OCC FINTECH CHARTER REPORT]. “FinTech” refers to firms that aim to solve financial services
problems through technological solutions.
19.
See id.
20.
See id.
21.
See Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271 (S.D.N.Y.
2019), judgment entered sub nom. Lacewell v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, [insert
docket number], 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182934 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019).
22.
12 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1982).
23.
12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2017).
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District of New York disagreed with this definition. In Vullo v. Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the court provided three reasons for
narrowing the definition to deposit activities alone.24 First, it
interpreted Civil War-era dictionaries to determine what “business of
banking” meant in the 1860s when the NBA passed.25 Most definitions
suggested that “banking” requires deposit-taking activities—
something absent from the typical FinTech firm model.26 Next, the
court noted that the OCC had never before issued non-depository
charters absent a congressional amendment to the NBA.27 Lastly, it
found that as part of the broader banking regulatory scheme, national
institutions in the “business of banking” (a) join the Federal Reserve
System (“the Fed” or “the System”) through the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act and (b) only acquire competitor banks in accordance
with the Bank Holding Company Act—both of which define banks as
“deposit-receiving” entities.28 The Vullo decision suggests that the
Second Circuit is resolute in closing off any regulatory loopholes left
by Madden.
Second, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
proposed a rule to reinforce the valid when made doctrine.29 The
proposed rule cites federal law that “authorizes State banks to charge
interest at the maximum rate permitted to any State-chartered or
licensed lending institution in the State where the bank is located.”30
The proposed rule claims that the “power to make loans implicitly
carries with it the power to assign loans, and thus, a State bank’s
statutory authority . . . to make loans at particular rates necessarily
includes the power to assign the loans at those rates.”31 The OCC
simultaneously proposed a companion rule, which stated that
“interest on a loan that is permissible under [the NBA] shall not be
affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.” 32 The
OCC rule was adopted in June 2020 and is scheduled to go into effect
in August 2020. 33 The new regulation will provide helpful guidance,34
24.
See Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 292–98.
25.
Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 293–94.
26.
See id. at 294.
27.
Id. at 295.
28.
Id. at 296–97.
29.
Federal Interest Rate Authority, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,845 (proposed Dec. 6, 2019) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331).
30.
Id. at 66,845.
31.
Id. at 66,848.
32.
Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 84
Fed. Reg. 64,229, 64,231 (proposed Nov. 21, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).
33. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85
Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7, 160). In adopting this rule, the
OCC noted that “it intends that its rule will function in the same way as the FDIC’s proposed
regulatory text would [in its December 6, 2019 proposed rule].” Id. at 33,535.
34.
See Randall D. Guynn et al., Federal Banking Regulators Can and Should Resolve Madden
and
True
Lender
Developments,
DAVIS
POLK
(Aug.
14,
2018),
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but the interaction between this rule and the Madden decision
remains to be seen. The result may be a dual-governance banking
system, with the Second Circuit attempting to accommodate both
Madden and the new rule while others maintain traditional NBA
preemption. Considering that most financial services firms maintain
some presence in New York,35 the consequences of the Second
Circuit’s decision have outsized effects. This might prompt the Second
Circuit to reevaluate Madden, but given the Supreme Court’s recent
denial of certiorari, it is unlikely that the Second Circuit will reverse
course on the specific issues presented in Madden in the near future.36
II. ADDRESSING THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S CONCERNS
The solutions above focus on (a) increasing lending in the circuit
and (b) decreasing the regulatory burden on financial institutions.
None of the proposed Madden fixes thus far, however, address the
Second Circuit’s underlying concerns about non-chartered entities
operating outside of the NBA and the court’s desire to protect
consumers. A proper Madden fix should not simply return the
financial system to its status quo, but rather take head-on the issues
prompting the court’s decision in the first place.
A. Fixing Non-Charter Involvement
Before Madden, the banking industry operated under the
assumption that 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 gave the OCC authority to determine
which financial institutions received charters under the NBA. 37 The
Madden and Vullo decisions challenged that assumption. Madden’s
primary concern was that lax exceptions to the NBA would result in
non-chartered financial firms operating without the proper
regulatory backstop.38 The court recognized that precedent had
granted affiliated firms and subsidiaries NBA coverage, though “[i]n
most cases in which NBA preemption has been applied to a nonnational bank entity, the entity has exercised the powers of a national
bank—i.e., has acted on behalf of a national bank in carrying out the
https://www.davispolk.com/publications/federal-banking-regulators-can-and-shouldresolve-madden-and-true-lender-developments.
35.
See California’s Fintech Startups Are Invading New York, AM. BANKER (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/californias-fintech-startups-are-invading-newyork.
36.
See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 2505 (2016).
37. See, e.g., Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 278–80 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
38.
Madden, 786 F.3d at 251–52.
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national bank’s business.”39 In Madden, however, the third-party debt
purchasers were independent. Passing along NBA protection in that
instance “would create an end-run around usury laws for nonnational bank entities that are not acting on behalf of a national
bank.”40 In Vullo, the court was similarly concerned about FinTech
firms acting as non-traditional banks. The court set aside the OCC’s
interpretation of “business of banking” and struck down the FinTech
special charters.41 These decisions make clear that the OCC’s
authority to grant special purpose charters is more limited than
previously understood—at least according to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit in Madden was reacting in part to the growing
complexities of Wall Street. Traditional brick and mortar banks are
not the only institutions in the “business of banking” today.42 FinTech
firms are taking novel approaches to financial services and operating
on the margins of a regulatory system designed for traditional
banks.43 Moreover, the “business of banking” itself has become more
complicated, as loans are no longer quaint lender-to-borrower
relationships that last for thirty years.44 Instead, loans are repackaged
and securitized to such an extent that it becomes nearly impossible to
determine who actually holds a loan.45 Congress formed several
agencies to monitor these developments, but the resulting web of
institutions only provided piecemeal oversight and could not
comprehensively address the system’s nuances.46 Dodd-Frank’s
Financial Stability Oversight Council was an effort to bring these
agencies together to solve systemic risks, but the pre-existing
relationships between these different bodies has resulted in turf wars
and regulatory overlap.47 In addition to Washington watchdogs, state

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
See Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 293–94.
See generally MIKLOS DIETZ ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., FINTECHNICOLOR: THE NEW PICTURE IN
FINANCE (2016) (describing how FinTech firms have disrupted the traditional banking model).
43.
See generally William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1167
(2018) (explaining that the rise of FinTech firms calls for a reconceptualization of financial
regulation).
44.
See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED
STATES
38–51
(2011),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (describing the growth of structured finance securities and
derivatives).
45.
See id.
46.
See Larry D. Wall, Large, Complex Financial Regulation, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA (Aug.
2015), https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1508.aspx.
47.
See, e.g., Gregg Gelzinis, Strengthening the Regulation and Oversight of Shadow Banks,
CTR.
AM.
PROGRESS
(July
18,
2019,
12:01
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/18/471564/.
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regulators wield significant authority over the banking industry.48
National banks might be able to navigate this multifaceted regulatory
environment, but smaller firms and FinTech companies struggle to
pay such high regulatory costs.49
Considering these challenges, it is time for lawmakers to rethink
the bank charter regime. The agency rulemaking process provides
greater flexibility to adapt to the rapidly-changing financial industry
landscape, but agency authority is confined by the parameters of their
statutory mandate(s).50 Vullo exemplified this, exposing gaps in the
OCC’s charter process since not all financial services companies are
in the traditional “business of banking.” Today there are charters for
national banks, state banks, savings associations, and non-bank credit
unions, among others.51 The OCC’s special purpose charters
attempted to bring non-traditional institutions into this banking
community but was unsuccessful. If the OCC continues issuing these
special purpose charters,52 they run the risk of additional judicial
intervention, burdening firms with prolonged, costly litigation. At
some point, new legal authority becomes necessary to remedy this
issue.
What the OCC attempted to achieve with the special purpose
charters represents one avenue of reform. Congress could bolster
these efforts by expanding the types of charters available to financial
services institutions.53 This would enhance clarity and increase
diversity in regulation, continuing to afford large national banks
every protection under the NBA while offering a limited version to
smaller non-traditional banks. This lawmaking process would take
place publicly, instead of in bureaucratic backrooms. Despite these
advantages, the full legislative process would open the door to
additional interest group involvement. Furthermore, an increase in
charter types would make monitoring this system even more onerous
for regulators.

48.
See Jay B. Sykes, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45726, FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE DUAL
BANKING SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS (May 17, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45726.pdf.
49.
Cf. Abhishek Srivastav et al., Is There a Benefit from Reduced Regulation on Small
Banks?
(May
17,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3389946) (articulating concerns about
the cost of a strict regulatory framework on small banks).
50.
See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003 (2015)
(discussing the predominance of agencies in the legislative process).
51.
See Robert Klinger, 2019 Banking Landscape—Charter Types, JD SUPRA (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2019-banking-landscape-charter-types-62914/.
52.
OCC FINTECH CHARTER REPORT, supra note 18.
53.
See Klinger, supra note 51.
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Alternatively, Congress could address non-charter involvement
by amending the NBA to place more expansive guardrails around the
OCC charter issuance process. This could take the form of specific
rules and limitations regarding the types of institutions under the
OCC’s control—in essence codifying a lengthier version of 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.20. Congress could also amend the NBA to better define what the
“business of banking” means today, pushing back on the narrow
definition announced in Vullo. Creating a straightforward definition
would help the OCC determine which organizations ought to receive
charters and NBA preemption and which organizations fall outside
the NBA’s scope of banking regulation. Redefining the “business of
banking,” however, would provide only a temporary fix. The same
problems with today’s definition would likely reappear in the next
twenty years as the financial industry continues to evolve.54 A specific
definition would require periodic, if not constant, revision.
These and other legislative options certainly exist and could
provide much-needed clarity. Reforming the preexisting charter
system framework, however, is only a band-aid to the deeper
systemic issues at the heart of the Madden decision. To address
Madden’s concerns, rebuilding the charter system from scratch
through congressional action is the best method to avoid constant
litigation and uncertainty.
B. Building Consumer Protections
Madden’s other primary concern was ensuring that states
maintain the authority to protect consumers. Though Madden makes
no explicit mention of consumer protection, it implied that
institutions not bound by the NBA might exploit consumers and
engage in questionable lending practices with little oversight. 55 The
court feared that non-chartered lenders, free of the state regulatory
constraints, would prey on vulnerable consumers through payday
lending and alternative financial solutions.56 Thus, any solution
aimed at addressing the Madden decision should also consider the
court’s consumer protection concerns.

54.
See Sam Stewart et al., Retail Banking Distribution 2025: Up Close and Personal, BOS.
CONSULTING GRP. (Sept. 26, 2019), https://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Retail-BankingDistribution-2025-Up-Close-and-Personal-September-2019_tcm9-230136.pdf.
55.
See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2015).
56.
Id. at 251 (discussing the ability of third parties to avoid federal banking law); Cf. GARY
RIVLIN, BROKE USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW THE WORKING POOR BECAME BIG
BUSINESS (2010) (examining the impact of certain lending institutions on the poor).
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Consumer protection laws for the modern financial system first
appeared in the mid-twentieth century. The Truth in Lending Act of
1968 (TILA) helped consumers understand the costs of credit,
especially with the implementation of a standardized annual
percentage rate to ensure consumers are provided with consistent
figures.57 Regulation Z, a Federal Reserve rule implementing TILA,
requires certain disclosures that provide consumers with a clear and
consistent picture of the financial commitment they are about to
make before signing a loan contract.58 Unfortunately, these
protections have not prevented predatory lending, and lenders have
found multiple ways to take advantage of consumers.59 The Financial
Crisis of 2008 was in part driven by these incomplete consumer
protections, as widespread loan transfers and securitization
incentivized financial institutions to churn out more loans and bring
more consumers into the borrowing pool.60
The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act
of 2009 (CARD Act) improved credit card rate clarity, but it did not
solve all problems.61 In 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) found that questionable lending practices still existed
and card policies still confused many customers.62 Specifically, the
CFPB stated that the CARD Act did not address deferred-interest
products that promise no-interest financing if quickly paid in full and
trigger exorbitant rates if that date is missed. 63 Moreover, the CFPB
found that credit card companies incentivize customers to join
rewards programs with obscure terms, requiring customers to accept
agreements that are up to 8,000 words long.64 The CFPB has reported
problems with other loan providers as well. For instance, it found that
student loan services often did not “provide the basic level of service

57.
See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
58.
See Compliance Guide to Small Entities: Regulation Z, FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/regzcg.htm (last updated Sept. 11, 2019); see
also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2020).
59.
See generally LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS
SURVIVES (2017) (describing certain predatory lending practices that detrimentally impact
consumers).
60.
See generally Victoria V. Corder, When Securitization Complicates the Issue: What Are
the Homeowner’s Defenses to Foreclosure?, 16 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 299 (2009)
(expounding upon the loan securitization and transfer practices of banks during the 2008
financial crisis).
61.
See Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2010).
62.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CARD ACT REPORT 76–84 (2013),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf [hereinafter CFPB
REPORT].
63.
Id.; see also Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Finds CARD Act
Helped Consumers Avoid More than $16 Billion in Gotcha Credit Card Fees (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finds-card-act-helpedconsumers-avoid-more-than-16-billion-in-gotcha-credit-card-fees/.
64. See CFPB REPORT, supra note 62, at 62–84.
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necessary to meet borrowers’ needs,” did not provide the proper
paperwork, and did not offer “affordable repayment options.”65
Against this backdrop, the Madden court attempted to reign in
non-traditional, non-chartered lenders by subjecting them to the
usury laws of the state where the loan originated. Despite the court’s
good intentions, this decision prompted non-traditional lenders to
leave the jurisdiction, limiting the banking market and thus limiting
credit availability to consumers within the circuit. 66 Ironically, the
court’s consumer protection concerns were upended by their own
decision. A spate of consumer protection proposals exist that other
articles and books discuss in far greater detail. 67 These proposals
advance fundamental themes that bear repeating. First, any solution
should standardize interest rates so that they are digestible to the
general public. Despite TILA, it is still possible to advertise rates that
are accurate but misleading.68 Second, loan agreements and
supporting documentation should not be so cumbersome that
consumers do not take the time to read and understand them.
Lenders should avoid fifty-page tomes for simple loans. Finally, any
solution should build on the progress of laws like the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act that make it illegal to discriminate when issuing
credit.69 It is becoming increasingly clear that any Madden fix will
require a legislative solution. In order to adequately address the
Madden court's concerns, lawmakers should take care to include
consumer protection provisions in any proposed amendments to the
charter system.
CONCLUSION
The Madden court aimed to restrict NBA protections to chartered
institutions and advance consumer protection, but its decision
resulted in decreased credit and lending opportunities within the
circuit. Though Madden has been fairly criticized, prompting multiple
attempts to reverse its impact, policymakers should not allow the
decision’s unintended effects to obfuscate the court’s underlying

65.
Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Concerned About Widespread
Servicing Failures Reported by Student Loan Borrowers (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-concerned-about-widespreadservicing-failures-reported-by-student-loan-borrowers/.
66.
Honigsberg, supra note 9.
67.
See, e.g., Martha Coakley & Alicia Daniel, Improving Consumer Protection: Lessons from
the 2008 Recession, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2477 (2019); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making
Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (2008); Michael J. Pyle, A “Flip” Look at Predatory Lending:
Will the Fed’s Revised Regulation Z End Abusive Refinancing Practices?, 112 YALE L.J. 1919 (2003).
68.
See CFPB REPORT, supra note 62, at 78–79 (discussing deferred interest products).
69.
See Equal Credit Opportunity Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691) (2012).
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rationales. Proposed reform efforts must be holistic and should not
only seek to promote credit access, but also consider Madden’s
reasoning before proceeding.

